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	– 	a	 potential	 source	 of	 threats	 (terrorism,	 drugs	 and	 extremist	 ideas,	
flowing	both	from	there	and	from	more	distant	countries,	above	all	Af-
ghanistan);	






































priority	 in	Russia’s	 foreign	policy),	 together	with	 some	external	 circum-
stances	(the	threat	that	the	region	could	become	destabilised	following	the	





Russia’s	engagement	 in	 the	hydro	energy	projects	 in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Ta-
jikistan	also	allows	it,	although	to	an	even	lesser	extent,	to	exert	influence	
on	Uzbekistan	 (which	relies	on	water	 from	rivers	whose	headwaters	are	
located	 in	 these	 two	 countries).	Moscow’s	 influence	 on	 Turkmenistan	 is	











•	 Russia’s	most	 important	 instruments	are	 the	network	of	old,	Soviet	 con-






































less	 and	 less	 as	Russia’s	 exclusive	 zone	of	 influence,	 and	more	 and	more	
as	a	‘no	man’s	land’,	where	all	external	players	have	equal	rights	and	may	
compete	freely	with	each	other.	




some	 issues	 are	 partnership-based).	 Another	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	 Cold	
War	paradigm,	still	present	in	the	Russian	way	of	thinking,	which	defines	
the	world	as	an	arena	where	superpowers	compete	for	their	zones	of	influ-






























combine	 the	 two	components.	Russia	wants	 this	 integration	 to	cover	 the	
largest	 possible	 number	 of	 countries,	 although	 –	 due	 to	 resistance	 from	
some	former	Soviet	republics	(especially	Ukraine),	and	the	change	in	the	














to	Russia,	and	could	cause	 the	 loss	of	a	 ‘buffer’	outside	Russia’s	 southern	




	– in	 bilateral	 terms	 –	 the	 implementation	 of	military	 agreements	with	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan;	the	establishment	of	a	second	military	base	
in	 Kyrgyzstan	 (in	 the	 south	 of	 the	 country,	 close	 to	 the	 border	with	
Uzbekistan)	 and	 the	possible	 return	of	Russian	border	 guards	 to	 the	

















































litical	 sense,	 since	despite	 their	 similarities	 and	geographical	 situation	 they	
have	no	common	(precisely,	regional)	interests	to	share	with	each	other1.	Even	
when	dealing	with	common	threats	 (drug	smuggling,	 terrorism	and	 Islamic	





















each	 in	 the	 process	 of	 forming	 its	 own	national	 interests	 and	 foreign	 policy	 priorities.”	































































i. central asia in Moscow’s policy. the historical 
bacKground
1.  the russian conquest of the region




































































2. central asia in the soviet period
In	the	Soviet	Union,	as	in	the	Russian	Empire,	Central	Asia	played	the	role	of	
the	supplier	of	raw	materials,	which	were	 then	processed	 in	western	Soviet	














































a	number	of	 enclaves	 owned	by	 their	neighbours	 (Uzbeks	 in	Tajikistan	and	
Kyrgyzstan,	Tajiks	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Uzbekistan,	etc.)	were	additionally	de-
limited.	Furthermore,	a	numerous	Tajik	minority	inhabited	Uzbekistan,	while	
Tajikistan	 and	Kyrgyzstan	were	 home	 to	 significant	Uzbek	minorities.	 This	
3	 The	factors	which	contributed	to	the	cultural	unity	of	this	region	(regardless	of	the	exist-
ing	strong	local	identities)	included	ethnic	and	linguistic	affinity,	and	especially	the	reli-
























of	Uzbekistan).	However,	when	 the	Soviet	Union	collapsed,	 this	 gave	 rise	 to	
serious	disputes	and	conflicts.	The	borders	delimited	in	the	Fergana	Valley	be-
came	an	especially	strong	source	of	 tension:	 they	cross	 the	 transport	routes	
(roads	and	railways)	and	watercourses,	thus	adversely	affecting	the	economies	
and	political	relations	among	the	countries	in	the	region.	








‘post-Soviet	 area’.	 Irina	Zvyagelskaya	 from	MGIMO	believes	 that	 “one	of	 the	
main	reasons	why	Central	Asia	was	abandoned	was	the	desire	among	the	Rus-
sian	 first-wave	 democrats	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 the	 political	 ballast	 of	 authoritarian	
regimes	which	had	grown	on	the	Communist	Soviet	substratum	and,	 in	 the	
opinion	of	those	democrats,	were	ready	to	back	Communist	retaliation”6.	Alek-
sandr	 Solzhenitsyn	was	 a	 patron	 of	 this	 approach;	 he	had	 already	 appealed	
in	1990	for	relinquishing	the	Soviet	 ‘borderlands’	which	had	been	supported	
financially	 by	 Moscow,	 and	 instead	 strengthening	 the	 Russian	 ‘core’7.	 The	
4	 Дмитрий Тренин, ‘Post-Imperium:	евразийская история’, Москва	2012,	page	176.
5	 One	exception	was	Moscow’s	active	engagement	as	a	mediator	and	intermediary	between	
the	parties	to	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan	(1992–1997).





























back	 to	 it	by	 themselves	on	Russian	 terms	 (i.e.	without	Moscow	subsidising	
their	budgets).	
Contrary	 to	 this	 assumption,	 it	 did	 not	 take	 long	 for	 the	 new	 independent	
states	to	appreciate	the	benefits	of	acting	as	sovereign	entities	on	the	interna-
tional	arena,	and	thus	they	had	no	motivation	to	go	back	under	the	Kremlin’s	
protectorate.	russia’s position in the region eroded deeply in the 1990s. 
this was an effect of a number of factors, which can be divided into three 






ture	of	Central	Asia.	the second group includes actions by other external 









a	new	post-Soviet	 identity	 and	 state	 ideology)	 and	desired	 to	diversify	 their	
foreign	 contacts.	the processes that took place in the region itself and 
the actions taken by the regional leaders form the third group of factors 



















primarily	 rejected	 the	 Soviet	 socio-economic	 system,	while	 in	 Central	 Asia	
“the	Soviet	era’s	social	[collective]	values	[...]	had	quickly	been	organically	in-

































ii. russia’s goals and its Means of achieving theM










this	 is	 the	 last	 part	 of	 the	 Soviet	 ecumen,	 apart	 from	Belarus	 and	Armenia,	
where	the	Kremlin	can	still	feel	like	a	political	leader,	albeit	ever	more	rarely	
and	with	numerous	reservations.	For	this	reason,	Moscow’s	presence	and	in-
fluence	 in	Central	Asia	are	essential	 for	 its	prestige,	 since	 its	 status	as	a	 su-
perpower	depends	on	them.	thus russia’s basic and most important goals 
are to maintain its influence there (and expand it, in the optimal case)10 
and to restrict the influence of other actors, so that it has the decisive say 
in the region’s most important issues, and that this prerogative not be 






Thus	Russia	desires	 that	Central	Asia,	which	 it	believes	 to	be	 its	 zone	of	 in-




























In	 the	 security area, Russia’s	 primary	 goal	 is	 for	 the	 entire	 region	 to	 be	
covered	with	a	 collective	 security	 system	which	 it	has	approved,	and	 in	 the	
short	term,	to	minimise	the	possible	negative	consequences	of	the	wind-up	of	
NATO’s	operation	in	Afghanistan	in	2014.	This	overriding	goal	includes	a	num-
ber	of	 lower-level	goals:	expanding	Russia’s	military	presence	 in	 the	region,	
preventing	other	countries’	(especially	US)	troops	from	being	deployed	there,	
the	return	of	Russian	border	guards	 to	 the	Tajik-Afghan	border,	and	also	 to	
serve	as	 ‘soft	security’,	by	reducing	the	volumes	of	drugs	smuggled	to	Russia	
and	restricting	illegal	immigration	levels,	among	other	measures.
In	 the	area of the economy,	Russia	desires	 to	keep	Central	Asian	countries	
dependent	on	it	in	selected	areas	(investments	in	the	hydro	energy	sector,	sup-
plies	 of	 fuels	 and	 petroleum	 products,	maintenance	 of	military	 equipment,	
etc.).	It	also	wants	to	maintain	its	position	as	a	monopoly	in	the	transit	of	hy-
drocarbons	from	Central	Asia	to	the	West.	




































long-term	Russian	military	 presence	 in	 this	 country	 (the	 Tajik	 government	
had	been	playing	for	time	before	that,	by	setting	numerous	preconditions)13.




















































announcements	 that	stricter	migration	 laws	will	be	adopted,	and	 the	osten-
tatious	deportations	of	 illegal	 immigrants	 from	Russia,	 represents	a	 form	of	
threatening	pressure	on	individual	governments.	For	example,	Moscow	used	
this	tool	in	autumn	2011,	when	a	group	of	hundreds	of	Tajiks	were	deported,	






On	 18	April	 2013,	 President	Vladimir	 Putin	 announced	 that	 citizens	 of	 CIS	









be	assumed	that	 the	great	majority	of	 them	are	expatriate	workers.	Алексей Бессуднов, 







































17	 Agata	Wierzbowska-Miazga,	 ‘Kreml	 zwiększy	kontrolę	nad	migracją.’	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	
OSW,	24	April	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2013-04-
24/	kreml-zwiekszy-kontrole-nad-migracja
18	 The	 Russian	military	 presence	 in	 the	 region	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 sections	
devoted	to	Russia’s	relations	with	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	Kazakhstan.


































a cultural affinity resulting from a sense of shared history is one of rus-
sia’s most important soft power instruments22.	As	a	consequence,	the	Rus-





































sian	 (and	 local	 Russian-speaking)	 media,	 especially	 electronic	 (TV	 and	 the	





-Russian-English),	 and	 the	Tajik	 language	predominates	on	TV.	The	Russian	
language	occupies	less	space	in	Uzbekistan	and	Turkmenistan,	but	it	has	not	
been	ousted	completely,	and	still	has	a	great	advantage	over	English.	Russian	











a	consequence	of	 its	gradually	being	superseded	by	 the	national	 languages	
in	offices,	education	facilities,	media	and	culture.	Over	two-thirds	of	schools	
with	 Russian	 as	 the	 language	 of	 instruction	were	 closed	 in	 Turkmenistan	
and	Tajikistan,	and	half	in	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan,	in	the	1990s	alone.	
In	2001,	all	such	schools	were	transformed	into	bilingual	establishments	in	
Turkmenistan26.	More	 and	more	 representatives	 of	 the	new	generations	of	

































However,	 the	 large	 number	 of	 organisations	 does	 not	 always	 mean	 that	
they	are	active.
nevertheless, potential threats are inherent in some of the instruments 
available to russia. The	presence	of	immigrants,	including	illegals,	is	one	
such	‘double-edged	sword’.	One	could	risk	the	statement	that	Russia	has	be-
come	dependent	on	the	cheap	workforce	from	this	part	of	the	former	USSR	












the	 Russian	 border	 were	 born	 after	 1986.	Михаил Фалалеев, ‘Гастарбайтеров обяжут 



























3. relations with individual countries












Moscow is still capable of influencing the current situation in central 
asian countries, albeit not to the same extent everywhere and not always 
successfully, as has been shown in the examples referred to previously 
in this text. what it cannot do is create the situation there. It	has	main-
tained	most	of	its	influence	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	(although	it	does	not	






Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan33.	Most	 likely,	 the	balance	of	 forces	among	 local	
32	 Wojciech	Górecki,	 ‘Raid	on	Muslims	 in	St.	Petersburg’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	13	February	2013,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-02-13/raid-muslims-st-petersburg	
33	 Moscow	has	taken	behind-the-scenes	actions	to	reinforce	the	position	of	potential	succes-























russia’s advantages include its comprehensive presence in the region, 
covering the areas of politics, security, economy and soft power, and the 
great number and diversity of the instruments available to it as a conse-
quence of this. it is therefore able, despite limited means, to pursue a rel-
atively successful policy towards two or three countries in this region, 
although not towards central asia as a whole. in this context, Moscow 
may only attempt to contain the expansion of other powers in this re-
gion.	The	Russian	stance	on	the	US	military	presence	in	the	region	following	
the	attacks	of	 11	September	2001	 could	 serve	as	an	example.	Russia	 initially	
backed	the	coalition’s	intervention	in	Afghanistan,	and	did	not	oppose	the	es-
tablishment	of	 the	US	military	bases	 in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Uzbekistan34.	How-

















































































the Kremlin has been pinning great hopes for strengthening its posi-
tion in central asia on multilateral diplomacy. the eurasian economic 
union/the eurasian union (the eeu/eau), which like the sco will com-
bine the economic and military components, is expected to be the crown-
ing achievement of the post-soviet area integration project promoted by 
vladimir putin, and the participation of central asian countries is a vi-
tal element of this project. It	is	planned	that	the	Union	will	begin	to	operate	
in	all	material	 aspects	 in	2015–2016;	 its	 fundamental	 assumption	 is	not	only	
a	counterpoise	to	the	activity	of	the	West,	but	also,	as	it	seems,	that	of	the	SCO,	
which	is	falling	more	and	more	under	Chinese	influence38.






from	 this	perspective,	 its	 support	 for	 local	 leaders	 (Moscow	does	not	 raise	
human	 rights	 issues,	 does	 not	 criticise	 violations	 of	 international	 conven-
tions,	 recognises	 the	 results	 of	 rigged	 elections,	 etc.40)	may	 be	understood	
as	investments	that	are	expected	to	yield	profits	in	the	form	of	various	con-
cessions	and	compromises.	Following	the	violent	suppression	of	the	Andijan	
riots	 in	May	 2005,	when	 Tashkent’s	 relations	with	 the	West	were	de facto 
frozen,	Moscow	acted	 as	Uzbekistan’s	 advocate	 at	 the	 international	 arena.	







The	 ideological	 foundation	of	 these	structures	 is	 ‘Neo-Eurasianism’,	which	draws	on	 the	
Eurasianism	concepts	born	in	the	1920s,	according	to	which	Russia	is	not	part	of	the	West,	



























precisely	with	 Kyrgyzstan,	where	 this	 influence	 is	 beyond	 doubt	 strongest.	
Russia	also	has	a	strong	influence	in	Tajikistan,	while	its	impact	on	Uzbekistan	


















































tary	 ones,	 although	 Kyrgyzstan	 had	 received	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 interest	 from	
leading	Russian	companies	operating	in	the	hydro	energy,	gas	&	oil,	mining,	
primary	 and	 arms	 sectors	 (such	 as	 RAO	UES,	 RusGidro,	 Atomredmetzoloto	
and	Gazprom;	the	latter	was	engaged	in	initial	exploration	of	the	Kugart	and	





46	 Айданбек Акмат уулу, ‘Российская военная база в Оше?’,	Азаттык,	1	March	2013	(http://
rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_russia_military_base/24916457.html).	 No	 additional	








































lands,	 paid	 US$16.5	million	 for	 a	 9.99%	 share	 in	 Highland	 Gold,	 a	 company	
which	owns	gold	mines	in	Russia	and	Kyrgyzstan.	Highland	Gold	was	granted	
the	gold	mining	licences	for	the	Unkurtash	and	Karatube	projects	in	201252.
48	 ‘Kyrgyz	Gvt.	 Approves	Agreement	 on	Kyrgyzgas	 Sale	 to	Gazprom’,	 RIA	Novosti,	 26	May	
2013,	http://en.ria.ru/world/20130526/181357205.html 
	 The	Russian-Kyrgyz	inter-governmental	agreement	to	this	effect	was	signed	on	26	July	2013	
in	Moscow	(‘«Кыргызгаз» продан «Газпрому» за один доллар’,	Fergananews.com,	29	July	
2013,	http://www.fergananews.com/news/21020).
49	 Unless	 otherwise	 indicated,	 the	 information	 on	 Russian	 investments	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	
and	 other	 Central	 Asian	 countries	 originates	 in	Marek	Menkiszak,	 Ewa	 Paszyc,	 Iwona	
Wiśniewska,	‘Aktywność	gospodarcza	Rosji	za	granicą	w	latach	2004–2010’	(OSW Report).	
All	 parts	 of	 the	 report	 are	 available	 in	 Polish	 at:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
raport-osw/2011-08-17/aktywnosc-gospodarcza-rosji-za-granica-w-latach-2004-2010
	 For	information	on	the	further	development	of	the	MTS	transaction	see Игорь Цуканов, 
‘МТС ищет киргизские активы на Сейшелах’, Ведомости,	14	March	2013.
50	 The	chain	consists	of	116	stations	(http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/).





























An	agency	of	Rossotrudnichestvo56	 actively	 operates	 in	Kyrgyzstan,	 supporting	





53	 ‘Киргизия запретила русский язык в делопроизводстве’,	Mail.ru,	13	March	2012,	http://
news.mail.ru/politics/12319087/





ryday	life,	while	less	than	8%	of	them	were	ethnic	Russians;	Александр Арефьев, ‘Сколько 
людей говорят и будут говорить по­русски?’,	Демоскоп Weekly,	251/252	(http://demoscope.
ru/weekly/2006/0251/s_map.php#1).








57	 More	 than	 40	 such	 organisations	 are	 registered	 in	 Kyrgyzstan.	 32	 of	 them	 are	 mem-
bers	 of	 the	 Russian	 Coordination	 Council	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 (Координационный совет 



















able.	However,	 it	can	be	assumed	that	 in	addition	 to	propagating	 the	agency’s	
activity,	grants	and	study	visits	for	journalists,	it	may	also	cover	the	publication	
of	articles	that	contribute	to	building	a	positive	image	of	Russia59.
Three	 so-called	 ‘Russian	 centres’	 operate	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 under	 the	 ae-
gis	of	 the	Russkiy Mir	 Foundation60:	 in	Bishkek	 (at	 the	Bishkek	University	of	
Humanities)61,	Kant	(at	the	oblast	library)62	and	Osh	(at	the	Osh	branch	of	the	





















































somolskaya Pravda Kyrgyzstan	 (with	a	circulation	of	 15,000	copies),	Moskovsky 
Komsomolets Aziya	 (7000),	Argumenty i Fakty v Kyrgyzstane	 (5000)	and	Rossiy­
skaya Gazeta v Kyrgyzstane	(3500)70.	A	significant	section	of	the	Kyrgyz	media	
also	use	the	Russian	language.	The	share	of	programmes	which	local	TV	and	
radio	stations	can	broadcast	in	Russian	is	restricted	by	law	(over	fifty	percent	
must	be	broadcast	 in	 the	Kyrgyz	 language71).	Newspapers	published	 in	Rus-
sian	 and	Kyrgyz	have	 similar	 shares	 in	 the	press	market,	 although	 the	 for-
mer	 have	 clearly	 higher	 circulation	 levels.	 These	 include:	Vecherniy Bishkek,	
which	 is	published	three	 times	a	week	(daily	 issue	at	 14,500	copies,	and	Fri-
day	issue	at	40,000	copies),	Delo N	(40,000)	and	Slovo Kyrgyzstana	(14,000	with	
supplements).	 The	 newspapers	 published	 in	 the	 Kyrgyz	 language	 include:	
Daat	 (50,000),	 Kyrgyz Tuusu	 (20,000),	 Agym	 (17,000)	 and	 Aaalam	 (13,000).	













































close	 the	base	 (and	 the	parliament	passed	 the	relevant	resolution	on	 19	Feb-
ruary).	Beyond	any	doubt,	this	decision	had	been	forced	by	Moscow	–	it	was	




























































77	 See	Konrad	Zasztowt,	 ‘Rywalizacja	Rosji	 i	NATO	w	Azji	Środkowej’,	Bezpieczeństwo Naro­
dowe,	 volume	 11/2009,	pages.	 132–134.	Washington	also	undertook	 to	offer	US$117	million	
as	non-returnable	assistance	to	the	Kyrgyz	government,	part	of	which	would	be	spent	on	
developing	the	airport’s	infrastructure	and	supporting	anti-drug	police	units	(the	USA	al-



































Kyrgyzstan.	There	 is	no	proof	 that	 the	Russian	government	was	directly	 in-
volved	in	the	coup.	However,	one	could	risk	the	statement	that	it	was	a	source	
of	 inspiration	 (the	 accusations	 brought	 against	 the	 Bakiyev	 administration	
on	Russian	TV,	which	is	popular	in	Kyrgyzstan,	were	certainly	a	factor	which	




































sia	 demanded	 to	 be	 given	 significant	 assets	 in	 the	Kyrgyz	 economy82,	wish-
ing,	as	it	seems,	to	‘test’	the	new	government’s	readiness	to	co-operate.	In	re-
sponse,	Bishkek	pointed	to	the	Russian	debt	linked	to	the	use	of	the	Kant	Air	

















81	 ‘Кыргызстан: Президент А. Атамбаев и представитель госсекретаря США обсудили 
судьбу базы «Манас»’,	Fergananews.com,	20	February	2012,	http://www.fergananews.com/
news.php?id=18194	
82	 Including	 a	 75%	 stake	 in	 the	 weapon	manufacturer,	 Dastan	 (it	 was	 agreed	 in	 February	
2009	that	the	stake	would	be	48%)	and	a	75%	stake	in	the	company	in	charge	of	building	
the	Kambar-Ata	1	power	plant	(instead	of	the	50%	stake	as	agreed	in	April	2009).	‘Россия не 




EastWeek,	OSW,	 10	 July	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-07-10/
kyrgyzstan-has-terminated-agreement-us-manas-air-base	
84	 Ibid.





























Russia	 is	Kyrgyzstan’s	most	 important	political	 and	economic	partner.	 It	
accounts	 for	 13%	 of	 Kyrgyz	 exports	 (third	 after	 Switzerland,	 32.6%	 and	
Kazakhstan,	24.1%)	and	33.2%	of	 its	 import	(first	before	China,	22.5%	and	




ence	(after	the	assumed	US	withdrawal	 from	Manas)	and	the	fact	 that	 it	












Union	 on	 numerous	 occasions;	 for	 example,	 President	 Atambayev	 said	 in	 an	 interview	
for	ITAR-TASS	agency	on	12	April	2013	that	Bishkek	had	taken	a	“firm	decision”	regarding	
this	issue	(but	he	also	emphasised	that	“this	does	not	depend	on	us	alone,	but	also	on	the	
CU	member	states	–	an	appropriate	decision	must	be	 taken	by	 the	 three	states”).	 Its	 for-














































91	 ‘Таджикистан ратифицировал соглашение о статусе и условиях пребывания россий­

































































Gazprom	 has	 been	 interested	 in	 Tajikistan	 for	 many	 years.	 A	 strategic	 co-
operation	deal	signed	by	Gazprom	and	the	government	in	Dushanbe	in	2003	
for	a	25-year	term	granted	the	company	a	licence	for	geological	exploration	of	
the	Sargazon	and	Rengan	oil	&	gas	fields,	 and	 later	 for	 the	Sarikamysh	and	










As	 in	Kyrgyzstan,	 an	 agency	of	 the	Russian	Federal	Migration	Service	 op-
erates	 in	Tajikistan99.	 Russian	has	 the	 status	 of	 “language	 for	 inter-ethnic	
communication”	(Article	2	of	 the	constitution).	However,	 the	new	National	
Language	Act	adopted	on	7	October	2009	states	that	Tajik	is	the	only	language	































where	Russian	military	units	 are	 stationed,	 and	one	operates	 as	part	 of	 the	
Russian-Tajik	Slavonic	University103.	Around	4500	students	receive	education	





gyzstan.	This	 institution’s	website	 lists	only	 three	Russian	minority	organi-





The	 Russkiy Mir Foundation	 runs	 four	 Russian	 centres	 in	 Tajikistan:	 all	 of	
them	operate	in	Dushanbe	as	part	of	various	higher	education	schools107.	The	
foundation	also	co-operates	with	a	number	of	Tajik	cultural	and	social	insti-







ed	 for	 approximately	 1.1%	 of	 Tajikistan’s	 population	 (68,200	 http://demoscope.ru/week-
ly/2005/0191/analit05.php);	in	December	2012,	the	Russian	Embassy	in	Dushanbe	estimated	
that	their	number	was	“over	40,000.”	(http://www.rusemb.tj/ru/index/index/pageId/276/).	
The	Russian	Coordination	Council	 of	 Tajikistan	 (Совет российских соотечественников 







































The	Russian-language	weeklies	Digest Press and	Vecherniy Dushanbe,	as	well	as	
Aziya­Plus,	which	is	published	twice	a	week	(this	corporation	also	owns	a	ra-




















































the	 return	of	 its	border	guards,	 the	 lease	of	 the	Ayni	air	base,	 and	prevent-
ing	the	establishment	of	foreign	military	bases	in	Tajikistan.	To	achieve	these	
goals,	Moscow	has	been	making	various	kinds	of	friendly	gestures	as	well	as	



































gaged	 in	co-operation	with	 the	USA,	which	was	using	 the	Karshi-Khanabad	
air	base	(see	section	3.3.2.	An	outline	of	Russian-Uzbek	relations).	Moscow	was	
implementing	this	project,	while	at	the	same	time	withholding	its	participa-






Dushanbe	 made	 some	 concessions	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 Moscow’s	 moves:	







whether	other	 investors,	 for	example	 from	China,	might	be	 interested	 in	 the	
project.	In	August	2008,	President	Dmitri	Medvedev	declared	in	Dushanbe	that	
Russia	was	ready	to	complete	the	construction	of	the	Rogun	power	plant,	but	he	
115	 In	 2004,	Tajikistan’s	 government	 signed	 an	 agreement	 envisaging	 the	 completion	 of	 the	
Rogun	construction	with	RusAl,	but	the	agreement	was	discontinued	in	2007	(the	parties	
were	unable	to	agree	on	the	height	of	the	dam:	Наталья Гриб, Владимир Соловьев, ‘Между 
Россией и Таджикистаном встала плотина’, Коммерсантъ,	 5	 September	 2007,	 http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc/801523).	 Dushanbe	 attempted	 unsuccessfully	 to	 interest	 RAO	











































concerning	 the	Russian	base	 in	 summer	 2012,	most	 probably	 after	 coming	 to	
the	conclusion	that	a	Russian	military	presence	would	help	it	ensure	stability,	












































ty/20120626/685459967.html#ixzz21d6Q7IRt).	 Even	 if	 such	 speculation	 was	 groundless	
(for	example,	Moscow	might	have	had	 intelligence	data	 suggesting	 that	clashes	could	be	
expected),	Russia	capitalised	on	this	situation,	 threatening	 that	 it	would	withdraw	com-
pletely	if	the	negotiations	failed;	this	made	the	government	of	Tajikistan	more	flexible,	as	
it	feared	possible	chaos	in	the	country	(at	some	point,	Moscow	even	withheld	the	financing	











years,	 and	not	 one	year	 as	 before.	 ‘Гражданам Таджикистана увеличили срок работы 







































	 The	border	with	Afghanistan,	which	 is	 1200	km	 long	and	a	 source	of	numerous	 threats,	



























3.3.1.  russia’s assets 
The (lack of) military presence
Uzbekistan	is	the	only	Central	Asian	state	not	to	have	concluded	any	agreement	
with	Russia	regarding	the	presence	of	Russian	troops	on	its	territory	since	the	
collapse	 of	 the	USSR.	Russian	 soldiers	 entered	Uzbekistan	 for	 the	first	 time	
in	September	2005	as	part	of	a	small	 four-day	exercise.	 In	2006–2012,	when	










Asia–China	gas	pipeline,	 running	 from	Turkmenistan	via	Uzbekistan,	 and	





125	 Александр Садчиков, ‘Ушла с базы. Россия может лишиться военных объектов 





63	bcm	(2011),	of	which	 thus	 far	 it	has	exported	only	 11–12	bcm	(mainly	 to	Russia,	which	
re-exports	 this	 gas	 to	 EU	 member	 states,	 and	 also	 marginal	 amounts	 to	 Kazakhstan,	






























































































просит правительство России ответить на «недружественные» запретительные меры 




















other	 foreign	 language),	 registry	 documents	 (birth,	 death,	marriage	 certifi-
cates,	etc.)	can	again	be	completed	in	Uzbek	and	Russian	as	of	the	end	of	2012135.
848	general	education	schools	with	Russian	as	the	language	of	instruction	op-





























District	 ‘Harmony	 and	Mercy’	 Russian	Culture	Centre,	 the	 ‘Rus’	 Centre	 in	 Samarkand,	 etc.	


















Rossotrudnichestvo’s	 agency	 in	 Tashkent	 co-operates	 with	 the	 Russian	 Cul-







Russian	 still	 plays	 an	 essential	 role	 in	 Uzbekistan’s	 information	 space,	 al-
though	unlike	in	Tajikistan,	Russian	media	are	even	less	accessible.	Upon	the	























































means	 and	 instruments.	While	Astana	 has	 joined	 all	 the	 integration	 initia-
tives,	often	as	their	initiator,	Tashkent	would	usually	distance	itself	from	them	
(albeit	not	 isolating	 itself,	 like	Turkmenistan).	 In	bilateral	 relations	with	 its	
neighbours,	it	would	usually	narrow	down	the	field	for	dialogue	without	seek-




Uzbekistan	 has	 consistently	 and	 ostentatiously	 resisted	 the	 ‘post-colonial	































bekistan’s	 sovereignty	and	 independence,	 are	 inalterable.	Following	 the	col-
lapse	of	the	USSR,	Uzbekistan	became	a	party	to	the	CST	(collective	security	
treaty)	 in	1992.	However,	 in	1999,	 it	chose	not	to	sign	the	protocol	extending	






ing	Karimov’s	dictatorship,	 and	also	due	 to	 the	president’s	 fear	of	 a	possible	
coloured	revolution	in	his	country.	The	West	froze	its	relations	with	Uzbeki-












‘Но и в церкви всё не так…’,	 Uzmetronom,	 13	 August	 2013,	 http://www.uzmetronom.
com/2013/08/13/no_i_v_cerkvi_vsjo_ne_tak.html




































155	 Tashkent	 became	 more	 important	 for	 NATO	 when	 the	 Northern	 Distribution	 Network	
(NDN),	 handling	 supplies	 for	 the	 coalition	 forces	 in	Afghanistan,	was	 launched	 in	 2009	
(although	the	USA	seemed	undecided	as	to	whether	Uzbekistan’s	offer	should	be	accepted	











































































































participated	 in	geological	 exploration	of	Caspian	offshore	gas	fields	 towards	
the	end	of	 the	first	decade	of	 this	century.	Another	major	Russian	player	on	
163	 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
164	 ‘Государственная пограничная служба Туркменистана’,	 Agentura.ru,	 http://www.
agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/greatgame/pogranturkmen/

















actions.	 It	had	2.4	million	customers	at	 the	end	of	 2010	 (while	 the	 country’s	















sian	 language	ceased	 to	be	used	 in	Turkmenistan’s	higher	education	schools	
–	all	 ‘Russian	sectors’	were	liquidated,	and	it	was	no	longer	possible	to	study	
in	 this	 language.	The	resulting	gap	has	been	partly	filled	with	a	network	of	


















































erating	in	2009	in	Turkmenistan	(А. Шустов, ‘Русские школы вытесняются турецкими. 





172	 My	own	observations	as	of	December	2011.	 I	 could	communicate	 in	Russian	without	any	
problems	in	taxis,	at	kiosks,	coffee	shops,	currency	exchanges	and	bazaars.	

































3.4.2. an outline of russian-turkmen relations
Energy	issues	have	always	predominated	in	Russian-Turkmen	relations.	
When	the	USSR	fell	apart,	 ‘Central	Asia–Centre’,	running	to	Russia	via	Uz-





































Turkmenistan–China	 gas	 pipeline	was	 launched	 (it	 runs	 for	 over	 1800	km	
and	has	a	planned	capacity	of	40	bcm).





















less	 effective.	 Finally,	 supplies	 to	 Russia	 were	 resumed	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
2010,	although	export	levels	reached	only	10.5	bcm	(the	level	before	the	crisis	
had	been	around	40	bcm).	An	additional	short	gas	pipeline	running	from	Turk-






182	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	‘Rosyjsko-turkmeńska	wojna	gazowa’,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	OSW,	



























not	been	 issued	to	 these	 individuals	since	their	 introduction	 in	2006.	 Inten-
sive	diplomatic	consultations	 led	to	a	compromise,	owing	to	which	individu-
als	who	had	been	granted	dual	citizenship	before	10	April	2003	(the	presidents	







183	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 ‘Turkmenistan	 getting	 closer	 to	 China’,	EastWeek,	 OSW,	 30	No-
vember	 2011,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-12-01/turkmenistan-
getting-closer-to-china	



















































































the case of baikonur
Russia’s	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 transferred	 individual	 units	 forming	 the	
Baikonur	complex	to	Roskosmos	(Russian	Federal	Space	Agency)	between	
1997	and	2011.	At	present,	the	following	Russian	enterprises	operate	there:	
a	 branch	 of	 the	 Rocket	 and	 Space	 Corporation	 Energia	 (RSC	 Energia),	
a	branch	of	the	Progress	State	Research	and	Production	Rocket	and	Space	
Centre	(TsSKB	Progress),	a	branch	of	the	Khrunichev	State	Research	and	














































193	 ‘Решение о статусе „Байконура” могут принять после 2050 г, считают в ГД’,	Ria.ru,	10	De-
cember	2012,	http://ria.ru/science/20121210/914211038.html
194	 Иван Чеберко, ‘Россия выдвинула ультиматум Казахстану на $500 млн’,	 Izvestia.ru,	
24	January	2013,	http://izvestia.ru/news/543574	









197	 ‘В 2018 году Россия начнет космические запуски с „Восточного’,	Infuture.ru,	http://www.
infuture.ru/article/9019	
	 Despite	the	construction	of	the	new	cosmodrome,	Moscow	intends	to	use	Baikonur	until	
the	expiry	of	its	lease	term.	Елена Объедкова, ‘Первую ракету с космодрома „Восточный” 































•	 an	 Independent	 Air	 Transport	 Regiment	 of	 the	 Russian	 Air	 Forces	 sta-
tioned	at	Kostanay	airport.	It	provides	transport	services	for	the	needs	of	
the	aforementioned	military	facilities.	
The	current	total	annual	 lease	rent	for	all	 the	sites	 in	Kazakhstan	is	US$27.5	
million.
198	 ‘Военные объекты, арендуемые Россией за рубежом’,	Ria.ru,	11	December	2012,	http://ria.
ru/spravka/20121211/914287081-print.html?ria=vqi2j1k4o8pcskkmornk3v7o6mknpmfi
199	 The	node	 is	owned	by	Kazakhstan;	 the	value	of	 the	rent	paid	by	Russia	 for	 its	use	 is	not	
known.	On	 29	 January	 2013,	 the	 defence	ministers	 of	 Russia	 and	Kazakhstan	 signed	 an	
agreement	setting	up	a	joint	regional	air	defence	system	(like	the	one	Russia	had	previously	
created	with	Belarus).	


















help	Russia	remain	 the	dominant	 transit	country	 (although	no	 longer	a	mo-
nopoly)	while	investing	relatively	small	funds.	Kazakhstan	has	been	making	
consistent,	albeit	 small	steps	 in	order	 to	diversify	 its	 transport	routes201.	An	
oil	pipeline	connecting	the	fields	by	the	Caspian	Sea	with	western	China	was	
launched	in	2006.	A	new	opportunity	to	export	natural	gas	via	the	extended	


















newspaper	Gazeta Wyborcza: “Kazakhstan	 is	making	efforts	 so	 that	 future	pipelines	will	
run	in	various	directions,	and	not	only	via	Russia,	as	is	the	case	now.	We	have	backed	the	
Baku–Ceyhan	project,	 and	our	participation	 in	 it	will	depend	on	 the	profitability	of	 this	
investment,	the	transit	charges,	the	situation	on	the	Mediterranean	oil	market,	etc.	A	pipe-



























































































209	 Marek	 Menkiszak,	 Ewa	 Paszyc,	 Iwona	 Wiśniewska,	 ‘Aktywność	 gospodarcza	 Rosji...’,	
op. cit.	LUKoil	 acquired	 the	 shares	 in	Kazakhoil	Aktobe,	Buzachi,	KarakudukMunai	and	
Arman	companies	as	well	as	the	right	to	operate	at	Yuzhny	Zhambai	and	Yuzhnoye	Zabu-









































including	Uranium	One’s	 share	 of	 601	 tonnes);	 a	 49.67%	 stake	 in	 Zarechnoye	

























































222	 RusAl	 company	 and	 the	 Kazakh	 holding	 Samruk	 established	 a	 joint	 venture	 known	 as	




































cember	2012	 that	 the	Cyrillic	script	would	be	replaced	with	 the	Latin	 in	 the	
written	Kazakh	language	by	2025,	a	move	which	is	expected	to	symbolise	the	
country’s	decreasing	dependence	on	Russia228.




entities	 and	 German	 by	 1253	 entities	 (http://www.stat.kz/digital/bizness_registr/Pages/
arhiv_12.aspx).




228	 Раушан Нуршаева, ‘Казахстан перейдет с кириллицы на „современную” латиницу’,	






















facilities,	 including	Moscow	State	University	 (since	2001231)	 and	 the	Moscow	
Aviation	Institute232	operate	there.
The	Russian	minority	accounts	for	over	twenty	percent	of	the	country’s	pop-
ulation233.	 Numerous	 Russian	 organisations234	 are	 active	 there,	 the	 largest	





















































extent	 than	 in	Kyrgyzstan.	As	 there,	 the	Russian	 language	 is	used	 in	media	
originating	from	Russia	(which	is	generally	accessible)	and	local	Russian	me-





































4.2. an outline of russian-Kazakh relations246
Ethnic	Kazakhs	did	not	form	an	absolute	majority	in	Kazakhstan	in	the	period	
immediately	preceding	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	According	to	the	1989	census,	
they	accounted	 for	 39.7%	of	 the	 republic’s	population	 (Russians	were	 37.8%).	
This	 unfavourable	 situation	 for	 the	 titular	 nation,	 along	with	 the	 country’s	
vast	area	and	low	population	density,	were	among	the	reasons	why	President	
Nursultan	Nazarbayev	decided	to	move	the	capital	city	from	Alma-Ata	(now	



















































does	 not	want	 supranational	 bodies	 to	 be	 created.	 Kazakhstan’s	 decision	 to	
start	using	 the	Latin	 script	 is	 a	 symbolic	 gesture	 in	 this	 context.	Moreover,	
proofs	of	Kazakhstan’s	assertiveness	and	determinedness	in	defending	its	in-
terests	have	 included	periodical	 intensifications	of	 tension	between	 the	 two	
countries,	caused	 for	example	by	 the	aforementioned	controversies	over	 the	
Baikonur	cosmodrome248.
All	this	taken	into	account,	Russian-Kazakh	relations	can	nevertheless	(with	
some	 reservations)	 be	 determined	 as	 partnership-based,	 which	 cannot	 be	
said	 about	 Russia’s	 relations	 with	 Kyrgyzstan,	 Tajikistan,	 Uzbekistan	 and	
Turkmenistan249.	At	the	same	time,	Moscow	and	Astana	have	conflicting	eco-
247	 In	the	opinion	of	some	experts	(for	example,	as	given	in	OSW’s	conversation	with	Nikolai	
Kuzmin,	 a	 journalist	 from	 Expert	 weekly	 in	 Almaty,	 on	 12	 December	 2011),	 Nazarbayev	
also	views	 this	 integration	as	a	means	of	 resolving	 the	 country’s	domestic	problems;	 for	
example,	he	has	sometimes	attempted	to	shift	economic	issues	to	the	level	of	the	Eurasian	
Economic	Community	(EAEC)	and	security	issues	to	the	forum	of	the	Collective	Security	
Treaty	Organisation	 (CSTO),	and	at	other	 times	 to	dialogue	with	NATO.	Astana	has	also	
drawn	on	 ‘Eurasian’	 ideas	on	 such	occasions,	presenting	 them	as	an	explanation	 for	 the	
special	characteristics	of	the	country,	which	like	Russia	is	situated	on	two	continents	(see	
footnote	38).	More	information	on	integration	projects	will	be	provided	in	the	next	chapter.
248	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 ‘Kazakhstan	 distances	 itself	 from	 Moscow’s	 integration	 pro-
jects’,	 EastWeek,	 OSW,	 23	 January	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-01-23/kazakhstan-distances-itself-moscows-integration-projects































































iii. the Multilateral and international context
1. central asia in Moscow’s integration initiatives
The	integration	of	the	post-Soviet	area	is	a	top	priority	issue	in	Russian	foreign	
policy.	 The	Concept	 of	 the	 Foreign	Policy	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 adopted	
on	12	February	2013	provides	that	Moscow	will	“actively	support	the	Eurasian	
economic	integration	process,	working	together	with	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	





nomic	 Commission	 as	 a	 common	 standing	 regulatory	 body	 of	 the	 Customs	
Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space.”	The	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	also	
referred	to	as	 the	Eurasian	Union	(EAU),	which	 is	planned	to	be	 the	crown-
ing	achievement	of	the	initiated	integration	projects	–	a	structure	similar	to	






It	 can	be	concluded	 that	Moscow	wants	 to	 cover	 the	entire	CIS	by	 this	kind	
of	deeper	integration.	However,	as	proven	by	the	experiences	of	the	last	two	
decades,	this	goal	appears	quite	unrealistic.	In	effect,	the	‘broad’	integration,	








































the	first	supranational	decision-making	body	 in	 the	post-Soviet	area	 (whose	
competences	cover	the	current	operation	of	the	CU	and	the	CES)258.
















tion	establishing	 the	Common	Economic	Space	 (CES,	 in	Russian Единое экономическое 



































its	 efforts	 to	attract	 these	 countries	 to	 the	Customs	Union	and	 the	Common	
Economic	Space261	–	which	has	given	rise	to	suspicions	that	it	wants	to	rebuild	
its	empire262.	These	attempts	(as	shown	by	various	statements	and	declarations	
Area	(FTA,	in	Russian	Зона свободной торговли, ЗСТ)	for	CIS	countries	was	signed.	The	
countries	which	joined	the	FTA	were	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Belarus,	Armenia,	Moldova	and	
Ukraine,	as	well	as	Uzbekistan	in	spring	2013.




































Whatever	 the	 forecasts	 for	 the	 future	 operation	 of	 the	CU,	 the	CES	 and	 the	
EAEU,	 there	 are	 also	 opinions	 that	Moscow’s	 integration	 efforts	 could	 com-


















istan’s	President	 Islam	Karimov	fiercely	opposed	the	 integration	processes	 (as	 leading	 to	
the	reconstruction	of	the	empire)	a	year	before:	‘Президент Узбекистана Ислам Каримов 





31	May	 2013	 (Tadeusz	 Iwański,	 Szymon	Kardaś,	 ‘Ukraine	 closer	 to	 the	 Customs	Union?’,	





















2.  the csto as a means of military and political integration























The	Collective	Operational	 Reaction	 Forces	 (CORF)267,	 consisting	 of	 around	
4000	 soldiers,	were	 established	 in	 2009	 as	 part	 of	 the	 CSTO.	 These	 forces	
have	taken	part	in	a	number	of	large-scale	exercises.	Meanwhile,	the	num-
























undermined	 the	 organisation’s	 reliability.	 On	 12	 June,	 Kyrgyzstan’s	 acting	
president,	Roza	Otunbayeva,	 asked	Russia	 to	bring	 its	peacekeeping	 forces	
into	the	conflict	area.	However,	Moscow	ruled	out	getting	involved,	restrict-
ing	 its	moves	 to	 sending	more	personnel	 to	 the	Kant	air	base.	 In	 turn,	 the	

























270	 ‘События в Кыргызстане подвигли ОДКБ к принятию нового Положения о порядке 
реагирования на кризисную ситуацию’,	Kyrtag.kg,	10	December	2010,	http://www.kyrtag.
kg/?q=ru/news/2734	














Pursuant	 to	 the	 CSTO’s	 statute,	 its	 member	 states	 consult	 and	 coordinate	
their	positions	on	foreign	policy	issues	and	regional	security	problems271.	In	
December	2011,	the	leaders	of	the	organisation’s	member	states	agreed	that	
third-party	military	 bases	 could	 only	 be	 deployed	 on	 their	 territories	 fol-
lowing	consultations	with	the	other	partners272.	This	was	a	success	for	Rus-
sia,	since	the	United	States	could	not	entrench	its	military	presence	in	Kyr-
gyzstan,	 Tajikistan	 and	 Kazakhstan	 after	 the	 Afghan	mission	 ended	 (this	
did	not	 concern	Uzbekistan,	which	 left	 the	CSTO	half	 a	 year	 later),	 unless	
Moscow	agreed	to	 it.	Meanwhile	Russia,	without	having	consulted	anyone,	





jects	 are	 to	 a	 great	 extent	based	on	Central	Asia.	Three	out	of	 the	 six	CSTO	
member	states	are	from	this	region.	The	ISAF	withdrawal	from	Afghanistan	
will	be	a	test	of	their	loyalty	to	Moscow.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	they	could	






































relations	between	 them;	 jointly	combating	 the	 ‘three	evils’	 (separatism,	 ter-
rorism	and	extremism);	fostering	effective	regional	co-operation	in	all	areas	
(including	politics,	trade	and	economy,	defence,	science	and	technology,	cul-
ture,	 etc.);	 establishing	 and	maintaining	 relations	with	 other	 countries	 and	




The	 Shanghai	 Co-operation	Organisation	 aspires	 to	 be	 Eurasia’s	 leading	 or-
ganisation	(the	areas	of	all	its	member	states	taken	together	form	60%	of	Eura-
















































China	 and	 Russia	 view	 the	 SCO	 as	 a	 convenient	 forum	 for	 striking	 deals	
and	neutralising	 tension	 in	Central	Asia.	Beijing	has	been	making	efforts	 to	
strengthen	the	instruments	available	to	the	SCO	in	the	areas	of	economic	co-
operation	and	security	(the	Economic	Development	Fund	was	established	upon	


































4.  the perspective of winding up the isaf mission in afghanistan
The	ability	to	respond	to	continuing	instability	in	Central	Asia,	and	to	the	de-
velopment	of	the	situation	in	Afghanistan	in	the	context	of	the	withdrawal	of	

















































consistent	efforts	 to	find	a	 just	and	 lasting	political	solution	to	the	problems	
faced	by	 this	 country	with	due	 respect	 for	 the	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 all	 its	
ethnic	groups	and	achieve	a	post-conflict	recovery	of	Afghanistan	as	a	peace-
loving	sovereign	neutral	state	with	stable	economy.	Comprehensive	measures	











































of	Afghanistan-related	 initiatives,	as	observed	since	 the	end	of	 the	previous	
decade,	such	as	its	successful	attempt	to	get	Afghanistan	granted	observer	sta-
tus	at	the	SCO	(this	took	place	at	the	beginning	of	June	2012).	It	appears	that	














284	 ‘Putin:	 Trzeba	 pomóc	NATO	w	Afganistanie’,	Rp.pl,	 1	 August	 2012,	 http://www.rp.pl/ar-
tykul/921231.html
285	 In	practice,	 the	Ulyanovsk	base	 is	not	used	by	NATO	precisely	foe	to	the	very	high	tran-
sit	 costs;	 only	one	 test	 cargo	 transit	has	been	 transported	using	 this	base	until	mid-Au-
gust	 2013	 (Forbes.ru,	 15	 August	 2013,	 http://www.forbes.ru/news/243493-tranzit-gruzov-
iz-afganistana-cherez-ulyanovsk-ostalsya-nevostrebovannym).	 US	 troops	 decided	 they	
would	 not	 use	 the	 base	 in	 October	 2013	 (‘США не будут использовать транспортный 





























286	 Numerous	conferences,	seminars	and	round	table	discussions	devoted	to	 this	 issue	have	
been	held.	One	of	the	many	examples	wasthe	international	conference	hosted	by	the	Bishkek	
Liberal	 Club	 and	 the	 Friedrich	 Ebert	 Foundation	 under	 the	 title	 ‘Страны Центральной 




refugees	from	Afghanistan	comes	to	the	region.	(‘Кыргызстан подготовил план на случай 
потенциального притока в страну беженцев’,	 Fergananews.com,	 29	 April	 2013,	 http://
www.fergananews.com/news/20592).
288	 The	existence	of	this	belief,	which	is	very	difficult	to	notice	and	cannot	be	quantified,	was	






























organisations	 it	 has	 established	 and	 supported	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades.	
Twelve	countries	joined	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	(established	
in	 1991),	 nine	 joined	 the	 Collective	 Security	 Treaty	Organisation	 (1992),	 five	
joined	 the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	 (2000),	and	 three	 joined	 the	Cus-
toms	Union	(2010).	In	Central	Asia,	Russia’s	influence	is	the	strongest	in	Kyr-
gyzstan,	 strong	 in	Tajikistan	and	 significant	 in	Kazakhstan	 (albeit	 skilfully	
balanced	by	Astana	with	Beijing’s	and	Washington’s	influences).	It	cannot	be	












































al	markets	 (pipelines	running	 from	the	region	 to	China	and	 Iran	have	been	






of	 the	 ISAF	mission	 from	Afghanistan.	Moscow	 seems	 to	 be	 less	 concerned	
about	 the	possible	 ‘hard’	 threats	 (it	 is	 separated	 from	 the	Afghan	border	by	
Kazakhstan	and	one	or	two	other	states)	but	more	about	 ‘soft’	 threats,	espe-
cially	drug	smuggling.	This	is	the	reason	why	it	attaches	so	much	importance	
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